Tag: Jack M. Guttentag

A Primer for the Protesters?

The “Occupy Wall Street” movement that started in New York and is moving into major U.S. cities aims much of its anger at the greed and hypocrisy of big U.S. banks. What isn’t clear, however, is exactly what the protesters would like to see changed.  

At least that is how New York Times columnist Nicholas Kristof sees it. In an opinion piece on Sunday, Kristof compared the protesters to their counterparts in the Arab Spring movement earlier this year. “There is a similar tide of youthful frustration with a political and economic system that protesters regard as broken, corrupt, unresponsive and unaccountable,” he writes, going on to say that while he does not share the “anti-market sentiment” of many of the protesters, he does think that during the last few years, “banks got away with murder. It’s infuriating to see bankers who were rescued by taxpayers now moan about regulations intended to prevent the next bailout.” 

As for the protesters, where the movement “falters,” Kristof says, is “in its demands. It doesn’t really have any.” To fill the gap, he offers the following suggestions.

The first: Impose a financial transactions tax. The second: Close the “carried interest” and “founders’ stock” loopholes, which he calls perhaps the “most unconscionable tax breaks in America.” And third, protect big banks from themselves by moving ahead with Basel III capital requirements and adopting the Volcker Rule to limit banks’ ability to engage in risky and speculative investment. He also endorses a proposal already embraced by Obama and others that would institute a bank tax based on an institution’s size and leverage.

KnowledgeToday asked Kent Smetters, Wharton professor of business and public policy, to review and comment on Kristof’s suggestions. As it turns out, he agrees with some of them.  For example, he thinks Basel III is “a modest step in the right direction. But I actually would modify the details so that the capital reserves required of systemically important institutions are tied to better measures of risk, including credit default swaps.”

He would “generally oppose a simple transaction tax — a very klutzy way to deal with a real problem about transparency and accountability of counterparty risk. Instead, I would require that most financial transactions occur through an exchange or clearinghouse so that a private third party, with a stake in the game, does the risk management. In contrast, a tax is an indiscriminate grenade that inflicts pain on both bad and good transactions. To use another metaphor, don’t use a sledgehammer to do CPR.”

He is not sure what he thinks about carried interest because “it really depends on whether we think that carried interest is in lieu of wages (that would normally be taxed at the ordinary rate) or forced investments from wages (that would normally be taxed as capital gains). Answering this question is part of my active research, and I don’t know the answer yet. But, I am fairly confident that Kristof does not know either, at least not enough to justify the hyperbole.”

He disagrees that a loophole exists with regard to founders’ stock. “In particular, founders’ stock [sometimes called restricted stock] is taxed at the capital gains rate because it is a long-term investment that is taken early. To be sure, it could be argued that the par price — how much a founder pays for the stock — is fairly arbitrary and too low. But the entire gain relative to that purchase price is still taxed as a capital gain, which is consistent with most long-term investments. Moreover, stock options, which are usually granted later, are taxed as ordinary income since they are not purchased upfront.”

So while he agrees that there is a legitimate debate about carried interest, “I think we should leave founders alone and let them innovate. Taxing founders above the capital gains rate strikes me as about as sensible as having a tax on sidewalk squatters.”

Jack M. Guttentag, an emeritus professor of finance at Wharton who runs a website called The Mortgage Professor, notes that all of Kristof’s proposals, “whatever their merits or flaws from a structural standpoint, are deflationary and will make the current economic situation worse.” His focus now is “the depressed housing market and the depressed economy, and the two are closely related.”

Guttentag argues that “Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, which are now in a Federal Government conservatorship, should roll-back their lending terms to where they were before the financial crisis. This would prevent a second round of home price declines, and, in addition to benefitting homeowners and the economy, would reduce Fannie/Freddie losses, which makes it a requirement of responsible conservatorship.”

 

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Debt Default’s Game of Chicken

In a blog posted this week, Jack M. Guttentag, professor of finance emeritus at Wharton, warned of the consequences — both immediate and long-term — of a debt default by the federal government. Asked by Knowledge@Wharton what continues to be the single biggest obstacle to agreement on a plan to increase the debt ceiling, he responded — “an ideological gridlock between different political forces that may be playing a game of chicken to see which one is going to blink first to prevent a catastrophe. To put the country through this horror in the expectation that someone will blink and everything will come out all right is just unbelievably irresponsible.”

One low point of the ongoing debate is a realization that the U.S. Treasury “has no mechanism for making decisions about the allocation of funds when they become scarce,” Guttentag added. But at some point, the government must figure out who gets paid. “God knows how those decisions will be made.”

Below is Guttentag’s take on the current gridlock over the debt ceiling.

“How would a debt default by the Federal Government impact the home mortgage market?”

We can only guess about the extent of the impact, but it would range somewhere between ugly and catastrophic. Ugly might be a doubling of interest rates and a drop of 50% in loan volume. Catastrophic would mean an almost complete shut-down.

About 95 of every 100 home loans being written today are placed into mortgage-backed securities that are sold in the market with guarantees by Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac or Ginnie Mae. These are federal government guarantees, the value of which would drop like a rock with a default.

At best, the securities market would immediately demand a sizeable rate premium on new guaranteed mortgage-backed securities to compensate for the added risk. This would immediately translate into sharply higher interest rates charged to new borrowers.

At worst, the markets for these securities would stop functioning altogether as investors retreated to the sidelines to await further information on which government obligations would be honored and which would not. That could be a long wait, since the systems the government uses to make payments have no provisions for allocating funds when there isn’t enough money to pay all claims, and there are no contingency plans for this [situation]. 

“If a default had the horrendous consequences you describe, and these induce Congress and the Administration to agree finally on an increase in the debt ceiling, how long would it take financial markets to return to normal?”

Markets would never return to a state where U.S. Government obligations are viewed as riskless. We will pay for this loss of grace forever.

Investors in fixed-income securities are worse-case oriented, and make a major distinction between the impossible and the unlikely. The current rates that the Treasury must pay investors are based on the assumption that default is impossible. Once a default occurs, it will never again be viewed as impossible. The additional cost of carrying debt on which default is possible will be paid forever.

“How much extra would it cost?”

That is not knowable in advance, but I’ll hazard a guess. My guess is that the cost of carrying the federal debt will increase by about 3 percentage points where it would more or less match the return on investment grade corporate bonds. On a debt of $14 trillion, an increase of 3% in carrying cost would add about $420 billion to our annual deficit.

 An optimistic estimate would be that the cost would rise by only .25%, which would increase the annual deficit by “only” $35 billion.

“Do you really think there will be a default?”

Given the current political impasse, I think the probability is frighteningly high. The message I drew from [this week's] address by President Obama and the follow-up comments of House Republican Speaker Boehner is that both were more heavily invested in their positions on spending and taxes than on the need to avert default. 

Many important events, especially in the political world, are the result of inadvertence. Nobody planned them, often nobody wants them, but events set in motion years earlier acquire a momentum of their own and nobody has the motivation and/or power to stop it. Since nobody wants it, everybody expects someone else to swing the axe.

In that connection, the threat posed to mortgage lenders, realtors and home builders by a debt default is enormous, but where are their spokespersons? When a bill is introduced to, e.g., eliminate tax deductibility of mortgage interest, the trade groups are all over the Congress and Administration to beat it. But on an issue that threatens their very existence, they are nowhere to be seen. Their assumption seems to be that at the 11th hour the politicians will prefer doing the right thing to laying the blame for disaster on their adversaries. In the current political climate, that is a terribly risky assumption.

 

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