Focus On: Philip M. Nichols

Mexico’s New President

Enrique Peña Nieto and his centrist Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) won yesterday’s presidential election in Mexico with talk of creating more jobs and bringing in more private investment, among other campaign promises. What he and his two opponents did not talk about, however, was how to tackle the drug cartels that have terrorized certain portions of the country and show no signs of letting up.

Mexico’s big problem, says Philip Nichols, Wharton professor of legal studies and business ethics, is “the insinuation of the drug cartels into government in general — regardless of who is in powear — and the astonishing violence that the cartels are willing to exercise against democratically elected or politically appointed people, journalists and others.”

All three leading candidates “avoided conversations about the cartels, although they acknowledged the need to control the violence,” Nichols adds. “I don’t think it’s because they are beholden to the cartels. My guess is they don’t know how to deal with them.”

Peña Nieto, 45, will have other issues besides the drug cartels to contend with if he hopes to take Mexico in new, more legitimate, directions. His PRI party, which was in power for more than seven decades before its defeat in 2000, was often associated with corruption and patronage. But since then, says Nichols, “sunshine has been let into Mexican bureaucracy, including into the PRI, which is not the same kind of calcified party it used to be.” The result has been “truly competitive elections in Mexico” over the past 12 years. If Peña Nieto “continues the kind of open policies and business maturity that the PRI now claims to have, the combination of those two things could work out well.”

Indeed, according to an article in The New York Times, Peña Nieto “campaigned without an ideological bent … and presented himself as a pragmatic manager…. He made the economy his centerpiece, saying that he would create jobs, lift wages” and open up Pemex, Mexico’s national oil monopoly, to private investment.

Peña Nieto will replace President Felipe Calderon, who steps down from a six-year term in December and, according to Mexican law, cannot run for a second term.

One likely direction for the new president, a former governor of Mexico State and the husband of a television actress, is to forge greater ties with Latin America, which has shown slow but steady growth over the past decade. “Mexico could, for example, further develop its already strong financial services and construction sectors,” Nichols points out. “The country could also further encourage foreign investment, which has already benefited from a policy of openness adopted after the country dropped its foreign investment code which, in the 1990s, prohibited most types of outside investment as a way to shelter its own industries. In reality, the country wanted to construct higher hurdles so it could accept higher bribes,” Nichols says.

But that is in the past, he adds, and the emphasis is now on moving ahead and focusing on the country’s strengths, including an educated, sophisticated population and an impressive transportation infrastructure that connects the country to the large markets that surround it. The stakes are clear, Nichols notes. “If Mexico grows, investment comes in. If the drug violence breaks the backbone of Mexico, then investment will dry up.”

In addition to Latin America, Mexico must also deal with its huge neighbor to the north. “Mexico is very dependent on North America, and to the extent the U.S. doesn’t get its economic house in order, there is not a whole lot Peña Nieto can do.” What the country desperately needs is for the U.S. “to rationalize its drug policy, because the appetite for Mexican drugs is destroying Mexico. The criminalization of drugs patently hasn’t worked,” says Nichols, adding that while the U.S. has coordinated policy with countries like Colombia and Peru, it has yet to do the same with Mexico.

Nichols suggests that Peña Nieto’s first two priorities “should be to work with the U.S. on a clear a drug policy, and to inculcate a culture in which the entire country is united in standing up to the violence.”

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Seven Years in Jail and a $190 Million Fine

When a Ukrainian court earlier this week sentenced former Ukrainian prime minster Yulia V. Tymoshenko to seven years in jail, fined her $190 million and excluded her from politics for 10 years — all because of a natural gas deal she negotiated with Russia two years ago — some government officials and legal experts in the West cried foul.

According to an account in The New York Times, European leaders “have condemned the case as politically motivated, and hinted that they are unlikely to ratify a free trade and association agreement with Ukraine” that has been in the works for four years. The court based its ruling on a natural gas deal that Tymoshenko — now an opposition politician after losing her bid for reelection in 2010 — negotiated with Russian prime minister Vladimir Putin in 2009 for what the court said was an excessively high price.

The Times also noted that Ukraine’s current president, Viktor Yanukovich, is likely to “soften Ms. Tymoshenko’s conviction swiftly.”

What is behind all the politicking, and who is really at fault? According to Wharton management professor Witold Henisz, “what is billed as a purely political attack is not without justification. Yulia is no saint. There were suspicious gas deals under her watch which she likely benefited from. Her allies certainly did.” The punishment, however, “does go beyond what you would expect and has a punitive political element [because it] takes her off the political stage. It also demonstrates the weakness of the court system.”

The “sad thing,” he adds, is “that all of the post-independence leaders, including Yulia, have themselves [harmed] Ukraine’s political and legal institutions by focusing personal attacks on each other and [amassing] power for themselves instead of finding ways to … build institutions and processes that could provide a better future for their country. Now one of them is paying a steep personal price for her misgovernance in the past. Is it too severe a punishment or too light for her role in Ukraine’s recent political history? The unfairness of Yanukovich sitting in the Presidency unscathed makes it seem so, but in absolute terms, Yulia, Yanukovich and [former Ukrainian president Viktor] Yushchenko all deserve some time behind bars. Even that unrealistic aim wouldn’t help the country, however, because they have left” behind them little capability or capacity for others “to rule in their absence or in a different manner.”

Wharton legal studies and business ethics professor Philip M. Nichols, who has done research on corruption in Europe as well as Asia, describes Yulia Tymoshenko as “a complicated person” who may “believe in democracy or in government that actually is accountable to the governed. Her past, however, lends some credibility to those who question her sincerity.”

According to Nichols, Tymoshenko made millions of dollars through her association with Pavlo Lazarenko, who eventually became the prime minister of Ukraine. During the Soviet era “Lazarenko held several high positions, and after the independence of Ukraine, he served as energy minister. During that time, he developed close relationships with leaders of various energy industries, including Yulia Tymoshenko, the president of United Energy Systems of Ukraine. All of these allies profited from their relationships with Lazarenko, who awarded Tymoshenko’s United Energy Systems a contract to supply one third of Ukraine’s natural gas needs.”

United Energy Systems benefited further from Lazarenko’s patronage when, “after he was appointed prime minister by [Leonid Danylovych] Kuchma, [president of Ukraine from 1994 to 2005], he partitioned Ukraine’s energy market into separate sectors, awarding single energy firms monopoly rights in specific regions,” Nichols says. ”Lazarenko facilitated the award to United Energy Systems of the most profitable contract rights, those of the industrial oblasts [territorial divisions]. The businesses associated with these monopolies accrued revenues equal to one fifth of the Ukrainian gross domestic product for that year. Lazarenko allegedly received payments from various energy companies in exchange for the award of monopolies. In the case of United Energy Systems, he also owned shares.”

International criticism rose to a level “that distracted even the venal Kuchma, who forced Lazarenko out of office,” Nichols says. “Lazarenko set out to destroy Kuchma politically, and recruited Tymoshenko as an ally. The campaigns on all sides were vicious and employed illegal tactics.”

Lazarenko’s story ends with him fleeing Ukraine, being denied asylum in Switzerland and facing trial in the United States, where he was convicted and is serving a seven-year sentence, according to Nichols. “It is almost impossible to calculate the damage that Lazarenko and his cronies have done to Ukraine. The damage is so extensive and goes so far beyond just money that it seems impossible. Lazarenko was listed by Transparency International as one of the eight most corrupt leaders in the world.”

Tymoshenko’s story did not end with Lazarenko’s flight, Nichols says. “She continued to fight Kuchma politically, and eventually found, and then left, a much better ally than Lazarenko: She became a star of Ukrainian and Eastern European media. But she got her start in an extensive scheme that bilked Ukraine of billions of dollars and gutted its nascent government. Her initial foray into politics was instigated by a fight to protect that scheme.  The fact that it took so long to convict her illustrates the fragility of Ukraine: That she has been convicted could be a sign of a much-needed change in how Ukraine deals with corruption.”

 

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