Throughout 2012, many analysts were predicting that RIM’s days were numbered. And in one way, that turned out to be true.

Last week, the Canadian firm announced that it would no longer be known as RIM – or Research in Motion – and instead was rechristening itself BlackBerry, after its iconic smartphone. Along with the change, the company introduced a new line of devices based on its latest operating system – BlackBerry 10. Combined, these actions have been widely regarded as a last-ditch effort on the part of the firm to remain a viable player in a market dominated by Apple’s iPhone and devices that run on Google’s Android operating system, such as Samsung’s Galaxy. (In the last quarter of 2012, BlackBerry’s U.S. market share dropped to 1.1%.)

Although many analysts were impressed by the latest BlackBerry devices — one of which incorporates a sleek, touch-screen interface, a “smart camera” and other features — some were disappointed that the firm’s newest offerings wouldn’t be available in the U.S. until March. Already, BlackBerry had delayed the launch of its new operating system for more than a year, and the additional delay sent a negative signal to BlackBerry investors. Following the launch, the company’s stock fell by 12%.

“This looks like a huge uphill battle for BlackBerry,” says Wharton emeritus management professor Lawrence G. Hrebiniak. “If market share equates with power, BlackBerry is close to powerless.” The company offers far fewer apps than its competitors, he notes, and its enterprise user base is continually eroding as companies move to allow employees to rely on their own devices for office email. In addition, “other smartphones are more powerful than the latest BlackBerry offering.”

BlackBerry “needed a bold, ‘swing for the fences’ move, and all we got is a so-so clone of other recent phones,” says Wharton marketing professor Peter S. Fader. “The image of the company revolves around a no-nonsense phone for busy people who don’t have time or patience to type on a virtual keyboard or to monkey around with apps. Many of the people who have clung to a BlackBerry — despite the social pressure to leave it — have done so because of the real keyboard it had traditionally featured, and the many conveniences that come along with it…. The new BlackBerry should have boldly featured a real keyboard and lots of keyboard-based conveniences that iPhones — and their myriad clones — can’t offer.” He adds that although BlackBerry announced it would offer a new phone that incorporates a traditional keyboard, “most people are totally unaware of it. Instead, all the hype is around marginal features that don’t offer any meaningful or long-lasting differentiation.”

“They had an incredible hold on the very large market segment that loved their keyboard,” notes Wharton marketing professor Jerry Wind. “They made huge mistakes by not keeping the keyboard and building around it the necessary software and quality services” to compete with Apple, Samsung and others.

In addition, the company’s decision to reform its brand around its well-known namesake smartphone seems like a step backward to some observers. “The rebranding strikes me as having a certain irony,” says Wharton management professor Daniel A. Levinthal. ”Now that the BlackBerry as a device is becoming associated in people’s minds with a somewhat dated piece of hardware, [BlackBerry is] defining the company’s identity in terms of this particular artifact.

“Adding to the irony,” Levinthal continues, “is that the alternate business strategy for RIM would have been to embrace their secure data network as the core asset and decouple that from a propriety piece of hardware. The ‘M’ in Research in Motion — connoting ‘mobile’ — is arguably more a contemporary statement than ‘BlackBerry.’ They have doubled-down on the propriety hardware in all ways … and, I think, have lost the last opportunity to reinvent themselves as a software/service company. They have an installed user base and can certainly generate some revenue from that, but the longer-run competitive dynamics look bleak.”

According to Hrebiniak, however, there’s still hope for the company. “Mobile carriers like BlackBerry’s operating system,” he points out. ”There’s no guarantee that this applause will generate sales, but it could help.” And if enterprise customers become more security conscious again, they could gravitate back to BlackBerry, he suggests. “But, in my opinion, the biggest hope for BlackBerry revolves around competition. A third or fourth player increases competition and keeps [company] leaders on their toes. This sparks innovation and lower prices. Apple has shown some weakness of late, which could help BlackBerry.

“Finally, people sometimes root for and help the underdog, and BlackBerry certainly fits this category,” he adds. “Super Bowl Sunday has probably affected my thinking, but I think that BlackBerry can make it, despite the very long odds…. The underdog occasionally pulls off the upset.”

On Tuesday, Research In Motion (RIM) announced that it will not make a profit this quarter — a big fall for a firm that was named the world’s fastest-growing company only three years ago by Fortune magazine. RIM also noted that it is working with two banks, J.P. Morgan Securities and RBC Capital Markets, to review its strategic options — a move that has many analysts wondering if the firm is looking to sell off all or parts of its business.

Following the profit warning, RIM’s stock fell 7.8% on Wednesday, bringing its market capitalization to below $6 billion. (It was $40 billion early last year.) Not surprisingly, it has been a tough time for RIM. The company’s BlackBerry smartphone has lost significant ground to Apple’s iPhone and Google’s Android devices, and last fall, its proprietary server network suffered high-profile blackouts affecting millions of subscribers. According to The Wall Street Journal, RIM’s share of the smartphone market fell below 10% this year.

What went wrong for RIM? Wharton management professor Daniel Levinthal says that “the longstanding problem and lost opportunity for RIM has been not decoupling their enterprise software from the [BlackBerry] device. Selling devices and software as a bundle didn’t matter that much in the world before [the advent of] ‘apps.’ But, once the Apple and Google/Android app ecosystems emerged, RIM as a standalone provider was no longer viable.”

Some analysts have suggested that RIM, which is gearing up for the rollout of a new operating system and series of phones, should get out of the hardware business altogether and focus on licensing its secure email system to other handset makers, or to companies like Google or Microsoft that would want access to RIM’s enterprise clients. However, Levinthal notes, “the window as a provider of enterprise software to a wide set of handset manufacturers is closing rapidly as a number of start-up companies are now focusing on providing that service to corporate clients.”

Others, like Wharton marketing professor Peter Fader, believe it might be too late for RIM to save itself. Still, he offers some advice: “Here’s what they should have done a few months ago, and should still try today: Focus on their strengths. They have a huge base of loyal, profitable users. Stop trying to mimic — or even compete with — Apple or the other producers of shiny objects.”

According to Fader, the company needs to “play to its business base as well as to consumers who [have] the same attributes” — such as little time for, or interest in, apps; a desire for real keyboards; a need for secure service and a preference for the company’s “good-but-not-as-novel-as-before” BlackBerry Messenger service. “That’s a whole lot of people, and none of the shiny-object producers have really won them over yet.”

Fader speaks from personal experience. “I’m loyal to my ancient BlackBerry and never want to give it up. I wish [RIM] gave me more reasons not to leave them when my battle-scarred, old phone dies” — which likely will be soon, he adds.

Two isn’t always better than one. At least that’s the line of thinking that Research in Motion (RIM) demonstrated on Sunday, when the Canadian company announced that it was replacing its co-chief executive officers — Jim Balsillie and Mike Lazaridis — with one CEO. Thorsten Heins, who has been at RIM since 2007 and was most recently a co-chief operating officer, will take on the new role.

RIM has lost significant ground in the mobile sector since the launch of Apple’s iPhone and Google’s Android-based devices. According to The Wall Street Journal, in addition to service outages and ongoing product delays, the company’s share of the smartphone market in the U.S. has fallen below 10%.

Balsillie and Lazaridis defended their joint-CEO leadership structure in the midst of the company’s well-publicized difficulties, arguing that replacing them at a critical time would only derail a turnaround. But some analysts have questioned the arrangement. In a recent Knowledge@Wharton article, Wharton management professor Lawrence Hrebiniak notes that having two CEOs could turn out to be a handicap in the long run, because it potentially muddles decision making. “When things are going well, none of this is questioned,” he adds. “When RIM was dominant, it could have had five CEOs and been fine.”

According to the Journal, Heins has a reputation for managing execution and has been training for his new role for some time. But the real issue for RIM, according to Wharton management professor Daniel A. Levinthal, is not the person — or persons — at the helm at the company, but rather where the entire ship is headed. “RIM, in my view, needs a new strategy,” he says. “The shift in leadership may help precipitate that, but a new person executing the existing strategy will continue to be disastrous.”

Heins, however, indicated during a Monday conference call with analysts that he doesn’t see the need for any “drastic” changes in strategy — instead placing an emphasis on “process discipline” and “scaling the company further.” He also said that he wouldn’t consider splitting up RIM into separate businesses. “We are strong because we have an integrated solution. We are vertical. We have our network. We have our services. We have our enterprise service out there with more than 250,000 enterprises connected to it. And we have fantastic devices and a fantastic ecosystem that we’re building. I want to build on that. ”

But if a strategy overhaul is really what’s required, what would Levinthal recommend to RIM? “My suggestion is to stop thinking of yourself as a device company — and certainly don’t bother thinking of yourself as a consumer product company.” RIM already has “a killer app,” he points out — the company’s secure email and instant messaging communication. “Let [those services] be device independent and run on Google’s Android [platform] or the iPhone. Communication would still flow through the RIM private network, and corporations will pay the ‘toll’ for that.” Doing so, he adds, would save RIM “a fortune developing and marketing devices that people increasingly don’t want to buy, and preserve [the company's] revenue flow.”